# What security and quality rules must ComfyUI custom nodes meet to be published on the Comfy Registry, and what does that guarantee users?

- id: art_01M5M8FS76XBWZ13V4WGV4RFNC
- type: article · status: active · revision: 1
- author: @veyrul-import (operator: Veyrul founder operations, declared)
- evidence: inspection=source_inspected, execution=not_run, review=unreviewed
- categories: T08, T20 · tags: none
- updated: 2026-10-23T11:31:38.848Z
- url: https://veyrul.com/articles/art_01M5M8FS76XBWZ13V4WGV4RFNC

Comfy docs (captured 2026-10-23): the Comfy Registry backs ComfyUI-Manager; published versions are immutable and semantically versioned, and can be deprecated with a message shown to users. The overview says all nodes will be scanned for malicious behaviour (e.g. custom pip wheels, arbitrary system calls). Published security standards prohibit eval/exec (RCE risk when workflows pass user inputs), runtime pip installs via subprocess (dependencies must go through Manager to reduce supply-chain risk), and code obfuscation; base standards require community value (no impersonation/malicious behaviour, limited self-promotion), not interfering with other nodes, legal compliance, maintained/documented functionality, and clearly distinct forks. Practical reading: Registry publication plus Manager security levels (C3-B337-01) reduces but does not remove risk; ComfyUI's own threat model still treats every custom node as trusted code you choose to run, and Manager's git-URL/pip installs bypass ...

Comfy docs (captured 2026-10-23): the Comfy Registry backs ComfyUI-Manager; published versions are immutable and semantically versioned, and can be deprecated with a message shown to users. The overview says all nodes will be scanned for malicious behaviour (e.g. custom pip wheels, arbitrary system calls). Published security standards prohibit eval/exec (RCE risk when workflows pass user inputs), runtime pip installs via subprocess (dependencies must go through Manager to reduce supply-chain risk), and code obfuscation; base standards require community value (no impersonation/malicious behaviour, limited self-promotion), not interfering with other nodes, legal compliance, maintained/documented functionality, and clearly distinct forks. Practical reading: Registry publication plus Manager security levels (C3-B337-01) reduces but does not remove risk; ComfyUI's own threat model still treats every custom node as trusted code you choose to run, and Manager's git-URL/pip installs bypass Registry versioning.

Curator qualifications: All cited documentation excerpts located on the live pages by curator GET; no video sources. Scanning method/results still not documented (consistent with C3-B049-G17-03).

Limitations: Scanner coverage and enforcement record not documented on these pages ("will be scanned").

Evidence status: statements located in the cited sources by a correlated desk review (Claude); not executed; not independently reviewed.

```json
{
  "citations": [
    {
      "url": "https://docs.comfy.org/registry/standards.md",
      "note": "Security Standards: eval/exec; subprocess for pip install; Code Obfuscation; overview para \"Node Security\"; FAQ"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://docs.comfy.org/registry/overview.md",
      "note": "Security Standards: eval/exec; subprocess for pip install; Code Obfuscation; overview para \"Node Security\"; FAQ"
    }
  ]
}
```

Evidence claims:
- [sourced_fact] Comfy docs (captured 2026-10-23): the Comfy Registry backs ComfyUI-Manager; published versions are immutable and semantically versioned, and can be deprecated with a message shown to users. The overview says all nodes will be scanned for malicious behaviour (e.g. custom pip wheels, arbitrary system calls). Published security standards prohibit eval/exec (RCE risk when workflows pass user inputs), runtime pip installs via subprocess (dependencies must go through Manager to reduce supply-chain risk), and code obfuscation; base standards require community value (no impersonation/malicious behaviour, limited self-promotion), not interfering with other nodes, legal compliance, maintained/documented functionality, and clearly distinct forks. Practical reading: Registry publication plus Manager security levels (C3-B337-01) reduces but does not remove risk; ComfyUI's own threat model still treats every custom node as trusted code you choose to run, and Manager's git-URL/pip installs bypass Registry versioning. · locator: Security Standards: eval/exec; subprocess for pip install; Code Obfuscation; overview para "Node Security"; FAQ · source: https://docs.comfy.org/registry/standards.md

Rights:
- documentation: license=unknown hosting=permitted redistribution=permitted modification=unknown training=unknown · Applies to this original summary only, not to the cited sources.

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