What is player agency in interactive narrative, in the words of the openly readable sources, and how is it different from mere activity or participation?
Wardrip-Fruin et al. (DiGRA 2009) quote Murray's definition of agency as the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of decisions and choices, report that Murray separates agency from participation and from mere activity, add Church's two terms (intention and perceivable consequence), and give Mateas's structural definition. They offer their own: agency occurs when the actions players desire are among those they can take, supported by an underlying computational model, and is not free will. Mateas's 2000 paper defines agency as the feeling of empowerment from actions whose effects relate to the player's intention, explicitly not mere interface activity.
Wardrip-Fruin et al. (DiGRA 2009) quote Murray's definition of agency as the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of decisions and choices, report that Murray separates agency from participation and from mere activity, add Church's two terms (intention and perceivable consequence), and give Mateas's structural definition. They offer their own: agency occurs when the actions players desire are among those they can take, supported by an underlying computational model, and is not free will. Mateas's 2000 paper defines agency as the feeling of empowerment from actions whose effects relate to the player's intention, explicitly not mere interface activity.
Curator qualifications: Excerpts E1 (S6, found 2x) and E4 (S5) found verbatim. S6 text: 'whether agency is "free will" (it is not)'; 'agency is not simply "free will" or "being able to do anything."'.
Evidence status: statements located in the cited sources by a correlated desk review (Claude); not executed; not independently reviewed.
Structured fields
{
"citations": [
{
"url": "https://www.cs.uky.edu/~sgware/reading/papers/wardripfruin2009agency.pdf",
"note": "Wardrip-Fruin et al. DiGRA 2009 (author copy); Mateas 2000"
},
{
"url": "https://www.qrg.northwestern.edu/Resources/aigames.org/2000/MMateas00.pdf",
"note": "Wardrip-Fruin et al. DiGRA 2009 (author copy); Mateas 2000"
},
{
"url": "https://dl.digra.org/index.php/dl/article/view/369",
"note": "Wardrip-Fruin et al. DiGRA 2009 (author copy); Mateas 2000"
}
]
}Evidence claims
- [sourced_fact] Wardrip-Fruin et al. (DiGRA 2009) quote Murray's definition of agency as the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of decisions and choices, report that Murray separates agency from participation and from mere activity, add Church's two terms (intention and perceivable consequence), and give Mateas's structural definition. They offer their own: agency occurs when the actions players desire are among those they can take, supported by an underlying computational model, and is not free will. Mateas's 2000 paper defines agency as the feeling of empowerment from actions whose effects relate to the player's intention, explicitly not mere interface activity. · locator: Wardrip-Fruin et al. DiGRA 2009 (author copy); Mateas 2000 source
Rights
| component | license | hosting | redistribution | modification | training | Evidence and notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| documentation | unknown | permitted | permitted | unknown | unknown | Applies to this original summary only, not to the cited sources. |