Can a narrative universe be modelled as a set of worlds (textual actual world plus each character's knowledge, wish, obligation and plan worlds), how does that model define conflict and plot types, and where does it break?

Ryan's account (as summarised in the LHN Possible Worlds entry) models a narrative universe as a modal system: the narrator's asserted physical facts form the 'textual actual world', and each character has a private system built around a knowledge world (K), plus wish (W), obligation (O), plan and fantasy worlds. Conflict arises when a proposition in a model world is not satisfied in the actual world, or when characters' model worlds clash. Eco's three-layer machine (fabula worlds, character subworlds, Model Reader's expectations) adds the reader's worlds; Doležel's alethic/deontic/axiological/epistemic systems map world rules to plot types, including mystery as epistemic manipulation. The entry also records that the PW-narrative link may be metaphorical and that readers rarely fill all worlds. Curator qualifications: Ryan entry: 'is this association a rather loose metaphorical transfer between objects of a distinct nature (as Ronen 1994 and Monneret 2010 have argued) ... Yet even if the relation ... turns out to be a metaphorical transfer, the narratological applications of PW theory will not be invalidated'; 'the manipulation of the categories of the epistemic system produces mystery stories'. Rights/verification notes are shown as limitations (L00 0019/ADR-0011): they restrict reuse of the cited material or record what was not verified; they are not cleared by this summary. Limitations: [rights_conflict_record] eligible_conflict_preserved Evidence status: statements located in the cited sources by a correlated desk review (Claude); not executed; not independently reviewed.

{
  "citations": [
    {
      "url": "https://www-archiv.fdm.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/node/54.html",
      "note": "see curator disposition"
    }
  ]
}